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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 13-2488 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
RAYMOND ZARECK, 
    Appellant 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-09-cr-00168-001) 
District Judge:   Honorable Joy Flowers Conti 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 11, 2014 
 
Before:   McKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: December 12, 2015) 
__________ 
 
OPINION 
__________  
 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge.  
 
 Raymond Zareck appeals his convictions and sentence for possession of a firearm 
by a convicted felon and possession of a firearm and/or ammunition by an unlawful user 
                                              
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding 
precedent. 
2 
 
of a controlled substance.  For the reasons stated below, we will affirm the denial of the 
motion to suppress, however, as conceded by the government, there was an error in the 
sentence and we will vacate the sentence that was imposed.1,2 
I.  
 A.   Motion to Suppress 
 Since the district court “base[d] its probable cause ruling on facts contained in 
[the] affidavit, we exercise plenary review over the district court’s decision.”3  The 
district court assessed whether the magistrate had a “‘substantial basis’” for determining 
if probable cause existed.4  A magistrate may issue a search warrant if “there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”5 
Additionally, a magistrate is “‘entitled to draw reasonable inferences about where 
evidence is likely to be kept, based on the nature of the evidence and the type of 
offense.’”6  
 Zareck admitted to disassembling explosive devices in his home.  He told the 
police that explosive powder remained in his home and that he had not taken any safety 
                                              
1 This court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
2 Zareck’s claims that the district court erred in categorizing certain prior convictions as 
“serious drug offenses” for purposes of sentence enhancements and that the district court 
violated Zareck’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights are meritless and need not be 
discussed.  See United States v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 154, 159–60 (3d Cir. 2014).  Zareck’s 
Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims are foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United 
States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) and United States v. Blair, 734 F.3d 218, 226–29 (3d Cir. 
2013).  
3 United States v. Ritter, 416 F.3d 256, 261 (3d Cir. 2005). 
4 Id. at 262 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983)). 
5 United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 554 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. 
238)). 
6 United States v. Hodge, 246 F.3d 301, 305–06 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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precautions to minimize the risk of fire or explosion.  Experienced members of the bomb 
squad believed that this created a potential risk of an explosion and they urged police to 
obtain a search warrant for Zareck’s residence to alleviate what they viewed as an 
obvious and immediate danger to the neighborhood.  Thus, the magistrate clearly had a 
substantial basis for finding probable cause to issue the search warrant and Zareck’s 
argument to the contrary is frivolous.  
 B.   Sentencing  
 To his credit and the credit of his office, Assistant United States Attorney Michael 
Leo Ivory appropriately concedes that the district court erred by imposing sentences for 
the violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as well as § 922(g)(3).  Though we have not yet 
resolved this particular issue, our sister circuit courts of appeals have unanimously found 
that although a defendant may be charged with violations of multiple subsections of 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g), it is impermissible to impose separate sentences for each subsection of 
the statute based on a single incident of possession.7  
Although we have authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2106 to modify the judgment 
of sentence on appeal, we think it more prudent to vacate the judgment of sentence and 
remand to the district court to allow that court to impose sentence on whichever 
subsection it deems appropriate.  In United States v. Parker,8 the Court of Appeals for the 
                                              
7 See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 508 F.3d 434, 441 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Richardson, 439 F.3d 421, 422 (8th Cir. 2006) (examining precedent supporting the 
imposition of one sentence); United States v. Shea, 211 F.3d 658, 673 (1st Cir. 2000). 
8 508 F.3d 434 (7th Cir. 2007).  These cases are consistent with our view that it is 
impermissible to have multiple convictions for possession of a firearm and ammunition 
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Seventh Circuit vacated the judgment of sentence and remanded to the district court when 
the district judge imposed two sentences for Parker’s possession of handgun as a felon 
and as an illegal drug user. 9  The court relied on Ball v. United States10 when determining 
to vacate the sentence because “there, the Court held that a muliplicious conviction must 
be vacated regardless of whether an increased sentence or extra assessment was imposed, 
based on the stigma, impeachment potential, and effect on future sentencing or parole 
eligibility.”11 
 Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing 
before the district court. 
II.  
 For the reasons expressed above, we will affirm the district court’s denial of the 
motion to suppress and vacate the judgment of sentence and remand to the district court 
to determine the appropriate sentence.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) arising from for a single "incident" of possession.  United 
States v. Tann, 577 F.3d 533, 537 (3d Cir. 2009). 
9 Parker, 508 F.3d at 441 . 
10 470 U.S. 856 (1985).  
11 Parker, 508 F.3d at 441. 
